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Chapter 3
States and Social Control
Stanley Cohen, who made famous the expression “moral panic” in his 1980 study of the Mods and Rockers, said that “social control” is a 
Mickey Mouse term (1985:2). Regardless of its membership among roden-
tia, the term is so broad and abstract as to lend itself to Mickey Mouse 
usage. When Edward A. Ross introduced the term into sociology in his 
1901 Social Control, he distinguished a broad and narrow usage. The broad 
usage roughly corresponds to society-wide institutions such as criminal 
justice, and the narrow usage corresponds to culturally shaped interaction: 
“purposive actions that define, respond to, and control deviant behavior” 
(Horwitz 1990:9). For Ross, the problem came down to how democratic 
polities could maintain orderly societies. The narrow and broad senses of 
the term might reflect a sociology of institutions derived from Durkheim 
versus a sociology of interaction acquired from Georg Simmel and 
George Herbert Mead. The Chicago School of Sociology of the first part 
of the twentieth century embodied both. In their seminal work, Park and 
Burgess identified social control as “the central fact and central problem 
of sociology,” and sociology as the “method for investigating the processes 
by which individuals are inducted to and induced to co-operate in some 
sort of permanent corporate existence we call society” (Park and Burgess 
1924:42). The interactionist view focuses on microsociology while the 
institutional takes on macrosociology. Of course, outside of heuristics, the 
two are not separable. Individuals interact with each other in regular ways 
(institutions) according to their beliefs, expectations, and values (culture). 
Moreover, interactionist sociology, which spawned what others called 
labeling theory, is annealed to social hierarchy and stratification.
Combining phenomenological insights and methodology with the 
American pragmatism and transactional analysis of George Herbert Mead 
permitted students of social deviance such as Edwin Lemert (1951, 1967; 
Lemert and Rosberg 1948) and Howard Becker (1963) to develop what 
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some called, often disparagingly, labeling theory. As Becker pointed out 
in 1973 by adding a chapter to his 1963 Outsiders, the labeling perspective 
was never meant as a theory. Becker, in despair at correcting the continual 
misunderstanding, wrote that, from then on, he would call it “an inter-
actionist theory of deviance” (181). Both he and Lemert often invoked 
the fact of social stratification to explain patterns of deviance. Briefly, 
they argued that those who labeled were the powerful, and those who 
got labeled were the weak. In modern society, the powerful and weak are 
defined by class and status. 
Therefore, for present purposes, social control refers to those strategies 
used by ruling classes to get everyone else to follow orders. Chief among 
the objectives of those orders is to answer the perennial question faced 
by all ruling classes in history: how to get the masses to work. The “state” 
refers to those organizations and institutions that employ formal means 
to implement the orders dispensed by the ruling classes. States have other 
definitive characteristics. 
The Evolution of the State
Too often, commentators confuse, conflate, or blur distinctions between 
the state and government or the state and politics. All societies, even the 
simplest, have some form of government as a means of collective decision 
making. For example, nomadic foraging peoples adopt episodic leadership, 
in which the best hunters are in charge of hunts, the most knowledgeable 
healers in charge of healing ceremonies, and so on. So too, all societies 
engage in politics, which are those activities by which groups make and 
carry out collective decisions. States, on the other hand, are complex struc-
tures involving sets of institutions whose functions control all other institu-
tions in a given society.
Empirically, and maybe theoretically, state political organizations 
coemerge with writing and class-based social stratification. Where there 
is a state, there is a written culture and class hierarchy. Settled agriculture 
has been a precondition for states to emerge, and this factor helps explain 
states’ territoriality. States define territorial boundaries that are both exter-
nal and internal. External boundaries define the reach of power, while 
internal boundaries delineate social stratification. Boundaries of stratifica-
tion begin with reserving the best land for the ruling class so that classes 
come to form around land boundaries. Social ordering reflects the nomos 
of the earth, to steal a phrase from Carl Schmitt (1950). Nomos originally 
referred to boundary markers in settled areas of ancient Egypt. Later, it 
took the more abstract meaning in ancient Greek, where nomos meant law 
or custom in contrast with phusis, which was nature. 
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Other structural characteristics of the state in addition to territorial-
ity are sovereignty, centralized government, coercive law, and ideology of 
legitimation. Cities formed the centers of early states with surrounding 
territories providing economic support for urban dwellers (Bauer 2007; 
Starr 1991). The patterns set in Mesopotamia and Egypt in the fourth mil-
lennium BCE. are recapitulated wherever pristine state formations emerge: 
China, the Indus River Valley, Mesoamerica, and so on.
Early states’ ideologies of legitimation derived from religion. The state 
and law had divine origins as did the prevailing class system that divided 
the populace into royalty, priests, nobles, commoners, and slaves. Typically, 
royalty claimed divinity. The early Hebrew state notably deviated from this 
pattern, as the king was not divine and largely a secular ruler. The secular-
ization of royalty was supported by the prohibition against worshipping 
idols. Royal power was limited by a transcendent god and law—the Torah. 
The Hebrew founding myth posited a covenant between Yahweh and the 
people as opposed to a covenant between a god and a king (Frankfort 
1978:343; Nelson 2006:13).
Classical Greece represents another watershed in the evolution of the 
state. Athens is the paramount example, beginning with Cleisthenes’ con-
stitutional reforms of 508/507 BCE. “Class conflict and often outright class 
warfare lay at the very core of the Greek polis. . . . [T]he politically domi-
nant class utterly controlled the state. . . . [T]he result was an intensity of 
political life and citizen involvement” (Nelson 2006:19; De Ste. Croix 1981, 
2004). The first theoretical discourses about politics and the state emerged 
from turbulence and strife; first Plato’s Republic, then Aristotle’s Politics 
and Constitution of Athens. Plato conceived the transcendent state derived 
from nature and constituting an ethical community premised on an 
abstract justice. Plato’s is an ideal state (Nelson 2006:20). Building on, but 
differing from Plato, Aristotle argued that justice was a goal, a telos, an end 
state of perfection toward which humans strive to realize their true nature. 
An important part of this striving required political engagement so that the 
ideal state was one that furthered the telic end. In addition, Aristotle recog-
nized the fundamental role of class in politics and class conflict. For him, 
justice needed to transcend class interests. For the classical Greeks, politics 
constituted law that was, therefore, always contingent. For Romans, on the 
other hand, law, although the result of human law making, grounded its 
authority in natural law (Cicero) or universal moral reason (the Stoics). 
The Roman idea of the state is first and foremost a legal structure, marking 
a major step in the evolution of the state. Moreover, the Roman concept 
identified the state as a public entity established by and through public 
law, a res publica. This Ciceronian idea entails a distinction between private 
and public and, therefore, a distinction between the state and society (27).
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What makes the state distinctive, setting it apart from the rest of society, 
is its claim on a monopoly of force in a territory (Weber 1919:310). Antonio 
Gramsci developed the idea of the extended state including the panoply of 
institutions and organizations that stabilize existing power relations such 
as the press, trade unions, the church, and mass culture (Wetherly 2005:2 
citing Sassoon 1980). In this view, the state manages power, ultimately 
backed by physical force and coercion. In capitalist societies, the state 
primarily functions to maintain stability due to the inherent instability of 
capitalism—the constant revolutionizing of the means of production and 
all social relations (Marx and Engels 1848:207). During periods of rela-
tively low social—and ultimately class—conflict, the extended state relies 
on market forces, and the extended state apparatuses to maintain stability. 
In times of intensifying conflict, however, the state brings to bear the tools 
of force and violence: “emergency powers are deployed for the exercise of a 
violence necessary for the permanent refashioning of order—the violence 
of law, not violence contra law” (Neocleous 2008:73). The periodic exercise 
of emergency powers springs from the nature and origins of the modern 
bourgeois state.
The political revolutions of the late eighteenth century, first in America, 
then in France changed the relation between the state and society. Backed 
by enlightenment-era political thought, the rising bourgeois classes laid 
claim to the rights of the social contract. No longer would the state be iden-
tified with the crown. It became identified with the people. Throughout 
the nineteenth century, definitions of the people kept expanding so that 
by the first decades of the twentieth century, advanced capitalist societ-
ies had adopted expanded governmental politics of liberal democracy. 
Extension of suffrage—women being granted voting rights—measures 
this expansion most clearly with the last great subpopulation brought 
into the fold by the end of the First World War in the United States and 
Britain.
The world economic crisis of the late 1920s and 1930s ushered in the 
rise of social democratic politics and the welfare state. Following the 
Second World War, mature capitalist societies governed themselves with a 
liberal welfare state. Marked by the worldwide uprisings of 1968 and the 
oil crisis of 1973, leaders of capitalism refashioned the political economy 
by dismantling the liberal welfare state. In the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in Great Britain, the welfare state was replaced by the regulatory 
state through revanchist, reactionary politics of the late twentieth century. 
This latest development means that the liberal Lockean view of the state 
as arbiter has increasingly given way to the authoritarian Hobbesian view 
of the state as absolute power. The significance of this shift cannot be 
overestimated, because it signals an end to the capitalist political economic 
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system dominant in the world since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.
One distinctive feature of capitalism as a form of political economy 
comes from its separation of the political and economic spheres. “Capital-
ism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby 
surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is ‘purely’ economic in 
form—the wage contract. . . . All other . . . modes of exploitation oper-
ate through extra-economic sanctions—kin, customary religious, legal or 
political” (Spitzer 1987:56 citing Anderson 1974:403). Under the capitalist 
system, social regulation largely relies on the economic organization of 
need and gratification as opposed to the political organization of fear and 
terror.
When the market mediates human relationships it is a process of “choice” 
rather than “constraint.” . . . [W]e need a model which goes beyond the 
concept of control as constraint. From this perspective, any theory of social 
control must not only understand the ways in which control is exercised 
through what is prevented or punished, but also what is allowed. 
(Spitzer:57 citing D’Amico 1978:89)
Spitzer goes on to contrast the liberal capitalist state with Fascism. Fascism 
exercises social control through deprivation, identification with a power-
ful leader, and aggression against internal and external enemies. Liberal 
capitalism replaces denial with indulgent consumerism and lifestyles 
replace status identities such as race. In such a consumer society, anxiet-
ies are allayed more by purchasing the right product than by persecuting 
minorities or conquering the world (58). Especially since 9/11, the world 
has begun to tilt toward the fascist form, which should not be surprising, 
as Fascism is liberal capitalism’s doppelganger (Neocleous 2008:13). 
Social Control by the State as Arbiter
Commonly, exegetes contrast John Locke’s political philosophy with that 
of Thomas Hobbes, characterizing the former as liberal and the latter 
as absolutist. Without entirely gainsaying that interpretation, it is worth 
pointing out that what they emphasize about Hobbes is his theory of the 
state, while for Locke, it is his theory of government. Hobbes is famous for 
his description of the leviathan, the great beast that quells all civic violence 
by a monopoly of force. Locke is equally famous for discussing govern-
ment as a third party to settle disputes—the state-as-arbiter viewpoint. 
Nonetheless, anyone who has toiled in the vineyards of jurisprudence 
knows that making judgments is one thing, but making sure they are 
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executed is something else. Most of Locke’s discussion of political theory 
describes the judgment part of the process. In this view, the state serves 
as a field of contest, setting rules, boundaries and limits, and providing 
the umpires. Later in this section, I argue for Locke and Hobbes’ similar 
views regarding the state, but, at this point, Locke’s theory of government 
and politics remains paramount for understanding the liberal capitalist 
political economy.
Locke is well known for arguing that governments should protect 
 property. Less well acknowledged is his assertion that property rights flow 
from labor; in effect, a labor theory of value. Locke posited abstract indi-
viduals entering into commerce with each other and instituting govern-
ment to facilitate that commerce. Following these principles, governments 
should provide regulations for the market, for example, ensuring reliability 
in weights and measures. They should also offer venues for dispute resolu-
tion and ensure everyone equal treatment before the relevant tribunals. 
Locke’s system of government assumes a rational populace and advocates a 
rational system of laws and government. He generally avoids discussions of 
class conflict of the kind Aristotle made central. The Lockean system, later 
augmented by such thinkers as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, formed 
the underpinning of the bourgeois plans for representative, parliamentary 
government most immediately successful in Britain and its former North 
American colonies. Nonetheless, a problem soon arose.
Once even limited democratic representative governments begin to 
function, they soon give rise to contentious, class-interested politics. More-
over, governments have privileged access to state apparatuses of power, 
control, and force. Within the first decades of the nineteenth century, com-
moners started demanding expanded democracy and  representation. One 
result was the Peterloo Massacre of 1819, which sowed the seeds for the 
English Chartist Movement in the 1830s and 1840s. Adopting the strategy 
of gradual reformism, British ruling classes increasingly formulated a lib-
eral political system. A similar pattern emerged in the United States. On 
the European continent, however, the ruling classes remained recalcitrant, 
hence the uprising of 1848. Fear of mass rebellion forced the leading 
capitalist countries of Europe to adopt the Anglo-American  solution, 
albeit belatedly. These gradual reforms eventually produced a new form of 
government: mass-based politics. By the end of the First World War, mass 
politics became the standard in all leading capitalist countries. The forma-
tion of mass politics led to two models: Fascism and liberal welfarism. The 
latter kept the basic Lockean principles, but modified its relatively laissez-
faire approach to market regulation. The result was the interventionist 
state represented in the United States by the New Deal and in Europe by 
gradualist social democracy.
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Social Control by the State as Ultimate Power
Fascism and Stalinism exemplify the Hobbesian leviathan model. Both reput-
edly autocratic, in practice, they were bureaucratic and, most importantly, 
dependent on popular support. What the interwar Fascisms and Stalinism 
shared was less an autocratic form of rule than elevation of a supreme leader 
to cult-like status—the Führerprinzip. Contrary to the propaganda, espe-
cially that churned out during the Second World War, the interventionist 
states and absolutist states shared a central ideological principle: government 
under a state of emergency.
The concept of state of emergency brings together Lockean and 
Hobbesian political philosophy with the rehabilitated, idealist theories of 
the state. Plato first propounded the ideal state run by philosopher kings 
who ruled the polis and its population. Hegel (1821) elaborated upon a 
transcendent state that embodied the world spirit. After the First World 
War, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt revived Hegel’s transcendent state. 
Weber’s version followed the liberal mode, Schmitt’s the fascist. Weber 
provided the main theoretical force behind the Weimar constitution, while 
Schmitt’s early writings sedulously attacked its parliamentarism with lofty 
and highly abstract politico-legal argumentation. Ironically, Weber insisted 
on one of the main elements of that constitution that made possible the 
shift to Fascism in Germany: Article 48 gave the president of the republic 
power to declare a state of emergency, take control of the state and, in 
effect, override the Reichstag. It was that legal justification that Hitler used 
to persuade President Hindenburg to declare a state of emergency after the 
Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933. The Reichstag Fire Decree eliminated 
the Communist Party from the elections of March 5. Suppressing the 
Communists—the third-largest party in the Reichstag—permitted Hitler 
and the Nazis to pass the Enabling Act of March 23, giving Chancellor 
Hitler plenary powers, thus ushering in the Third Reich. What made 
Weber’s involvement ironic was that he was a staunch supporter of lib-
eralism and parliamentary, representative government. Ironic it may be, 
but the theoretical concept behind Article 48 is the necessity of absolutist 
powers for the sovereign in times of threat to the nation. On this point, 
Locke and Hobbes agreed.
They agreed, because at the heart of bourgeois liberalism lies the need to 
ensure stability. That need, and the political and legal institutions required 
to meet it, signal one of the basic contradictions of capitalism. On the one 
hand, it produces constant revolutionizing of the means of production 
and, thereby, constant change in market relations resulting in continual 
disruption of all social relations, as Marx and Engels observed in their 
1848 Manifesto. On the other hand, capitalists need predictability—the 
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predictability of contracts, laws, markets, and so on—to make profits. 
Capitalism is a future-oriented economic system. Mark Neocleous has 
shown in his 2008 Critique of Security that the state of emergency must, 
therefore, be part of every bourgeois liberal political system. He traces its 
conceptual origins to both Locke and Hobbes. Hobbes explicitly justified 
the absolute state based on the ever-present threat of society reverting 
back to a state of nature and, therefore, perpetual insecurity. In contrast, 
Locke obscured his predilection for absolutism. He called it prerogative. 
“Prerogative therefore grants to the sovereign discretionary powers not 
bound by law. This is ‘an Arbitrary Power,’ Locke comments in parenthe-
ses” (Neocleous:15). While Locke implied that such prerogative power by 
the executive would apply only to foreign affairs and war, elsewhere he 
said domestic and foreign affairs are not really separable and are almost 
always united (Neocleous:16 citing Locke 1689 II:§3, 147). His justifica-
tion was that circumstances arise during which it is impractical to sum-
mon the legislature because of immediate need for action, that is, states of 
emergency.
States of emergency come about in the context of “reasons of state”—
one of those sophisticated phrases of ruling elites. Reasons of state differ 
from politics—the quotidian contentiousness of parties and class interests. 
Reasons of state trump politics, because they are rationalized by threats 
to the security of the entire society. States of emergency are matters of 
state, not politics. This was Carl Schmitt’s argument in his antiliberal and 
antirepublican writing of the 1920s (1919, 1922, 1923, 1927). The same 
formula figures in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence and 
political theory aside from John Locke. James Harrington (1611–1677) in 
his The Commonwealth of Oceana, originally published in 1656 (Blitzer 
1981:p. xi) discussed the emergency powers concept. According to one 
twentieth century Harrington scholar and editor, “At the time of the 
American Revolution . . . Harrington’s writings . . . reached the peak of 
their popularity in this country, and Harrington himself enjoyed among 
American political theorists and practitioners a reputation second only 
to that of John Locke” (Pocock 1977:129–130, 150). In Harrington’s plan, 
the legislature sets up a special council with extraordinary, as he calls it, 
“Dictatorian” powers (Pocock, 1977:254). Such a council would have 
complete military command and legislative authority. Harrington cites 
the survival of the commonwealth as abrogating normal legal and moral 
constraints. More recently, the rationale of emergency executive powers 
was made by two political theorists of the Cold War era. Clinton Rossiter, 
in his 1948 Constitutional Dictatorship, used the period of 1919–1933 as 
a time of emergency, comparing the Unites States, Great Britain, France, 
and Germany. Perhaps even more pointedly, Rossiter discusses the United 
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States during the great depression and the Second World War as an exam-
ple of a constitutional dictatorship. Carl Friedrich (1957) also addressed 
the issue, reviewing political theorists from Machiavelli through Hegel.
The Nature of Law and the State
As states extend their authority throughout a society, they override and 
subsume alternative sources of authority—corporate kin groups, religious 
organizations, and whatever stands in the way of total control. A principal 
means by which they gain control is law. The state makes laws that cre-
ate and take account of individualized, legal persons. The law substitutes 
these persons for families, religious orders, and so on. Instead of corporate 
responsibility, the state creates several, or individual, responsibilies under 
law. State formation relies on individualization through law, which is most 
apparent when examining archaic protostates. Emerging states character-
istically create a census-tax-conscription system. The census enumerates 
individuals, taxes them, and conscripts them into armies or public labor. 
Individuals become assets of the state (Diamond 1971). As states begin to 
emerge, laws vie with customs as arbiters of social conflict. Criminal law 
replaces tort.
The intention of the civil power is epitomized in the sanctions against 
homicide and suicide—typical of early polities; indeed, they were among 
the first civil laws. Just as the sovereign is said to own the land, intimat-
ing the mature right of eminent domain, so the individual is ultimately 
conceived as the chattel of the state. Persons are conceived as les choses du 
monarchque (Diamond 1971:252). 
This process does not represent some enlightened and progres-
sive development in human rights, but the assertion of authority by a 
new political form—the state. Without a state, societies treat homicide 
as a tort, but once the state emerges, the blow striking down a person be -
comes the deprivation of a political, economic, and military resource to the 
sovereign. Unlike societies where corporate groups sought compensation, 
the state resorts to its definitive response, that of retaliation; hence the law 
of the talion so characteristic of early states. State ideology rationalizes lex 
talionis (law of retaliation) as punishment. Nonetheless, the process of an 
emerging concept of criminal law and punishment does not occur with-
out, often violent, conflict. Laws create the individual subject of the law, 
often with grades or variations of rights and obligations depending on the 
subject’s status. As Max Weber put it, the content of law is determined by 
status (1925:144).
It is a hallmark of rationalizing modernism to separate status and class. 
Equality before the law increasingly means abolishing status distinction 
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regarding rights and obligations. American law no longer distinguishes 
rights and obligations based on race, those based on gender are fast 
diminishing, and various other status designations are losing legal expres-
sion. The trends in law are toward regulating class-based social relations. 
Consequently, the American criminal justice system keeps order by apply-
ing criminal law to the lowest classes, civil law to the middling classes—the 
professions, technicians, managers, and the like—and corporate law to the 
ruling classes. In this case, “corporate law” refers to the business corpora-
tion along with the older sense of “corporate” referring to kin groups and 
the similar structures. The content of the law changes, and so does the 
ontological status of those subject to the law (Chambliss 1964:77).
The law, in its totality, is a sign that stands for force. It is in this sense 
that law and the state coemerge. As the state claims a monopoly on vio-
lence so it claims a monopoly on coining the law. At the same time, the 
state normalizes the law. Less necessary in absolutist governments where, 
force, violence, and law exhibit quotidian links and forgetfulness of the 
force behind law reaches its apotheosis in liberal democracies. It is in 
law’s “representativity that originary violence is consigned to oblivion. 
This amnesic loss of consciousness does not happen by accident. . . . The 
parliaments live in forgetfulness of the violence from which they were 
born” (Derrida 1992:47). Derrida was commenting on Walter Benjamin’s 
1921 essay, “Critique of Violence.” Benjamin singles out police violence.
Its power is formless, like its nowhere tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly pres-
ence in the life of civilized states. . . . Their spirit is less devastating where 
they represent, in absolute monarch, the power of a ruler in which legislative 
and executive supremacy are united, than in democracies where their exis-
tence, elevated by no such relation, bears witness to the greatest conceivable 
degeneration of violence. . . . All violence as a means is either law making 
or law preserving. If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all 
validity (287).
. . . For the function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense 
that lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to 
be established as law, but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss 
violence; rather, at this very moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes 
as law not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately 
bound to it, under the title of power. Lawmaking is power making, and, to 
that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence (295). 
Eerily, Egon Bittner (1967) made a similar point about police as the armed 
force of the state. It is eerie because each was writing in the penumbra of 
failed revolutions, Benjamin of 1919 and Bittner of 1968, in which state 
police forces crushed rebellions against state power. Benjamin’s point is 
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broader than Bittner’s. What Bittner had in mind was the local cop-on-
the-beat kind of policing. Benjamin addressed the police power of the state 
in general, state-regulated order. However that regulation may be carried 
out in a particular circumstance, the force and violence of the state always 
lie underneath. Robert M. Cover applied the concept to judicial interpreta-
tion, but his insights are generalizable to all applications of law.
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true 
in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition 
of violence upon others: a judge articulates her understanding of a text, 
and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his  children, 
even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for vio-
lence—which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When 
interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims 
whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of 
violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may 
be properly understood apart from one another. This much is obvious 
though: the growing literature that argues for the centrality of interpretive 
practices in law blithely ignores it (Cover 1986:1601).
Hegemony: The Liberal Approach
The liberal bourgeois state rationalizes its control by appeals to consent. 
In fact, such rationalizations are similar to that of hypocrisy as the hom-
age vice pays to virtue (François, duc de La Rochefoucauld in Bartlett 
1919:9529). Mass polities cannot be ruled without consent. By the end of 
the Franco-Prussian War (1871), the bourgeoisie, the capitalist or owning 
class, had gained control of the state apparatuses in the leading capitalist 
countries in Europe and North America. Nonetheless, control of the state 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for hegemony. Coincident with 
the reorganization of monopoly and neocolonial capitalism, the ruling 
classes gradually came to control the various cultural apparatuses. This 
allowed them to manufacture consent in Michael Buroway’s felicitous 
phrase (1979). They were so successful that among the main belliger-
ents, the masses rushed to the support of their governments for the First 
World War.
The critical usage of the concept of hegemony comes from Antonio 
Gramsci’s development of the notion in Prison Notebooks (1971). That 
work, and Anne S. Sassoon’s (1980, 1987) explication of his political 
writings, informs the following discussion. The ability to set rules and 
boundaries defines hegemony. Hegemonic control takes two forms: 
leadership of allies and domination of adversaries. In the world capitalist 
system since the Second World War, two organizations exemplify both 
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strategies: the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). They 
coordinate cooperative efforts among the major owners of the world while 
at the same time they keep in line periphery governments that might oth-
erwise resist or challenge international capitalist supremacy. The fractal 
nature of the structure of hegemony remains critical for understanding its 
functioning. The United States holds the majority voice at both the IMF 
and World Bank, with Japan and Britain playing second leads. The same 
neoliberal strategies applied by these two world institutions, especially 
with respect to developing countries, shows up in national neoliberal eco-
nomic policies in the United States and Britain, where they became known 
as Reaganism and Thatcherism respectively. At a far lower level in terms of 
volume of capital, the same principles and kinds of relationships manifest 
at local levels among small-town Babbitts. Hegemony, therefore, has both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. Horizontally, the hegemonic class 
guides the levers of culture—the mass media, education, arts, and so on. 
Note that the operative verb is “guide,” not control. That is, hegemony 
eschews domination or micromanaging. Vertically, hegemony replicates 
its patterns from the highest levels of the world political economy down 
to the lowest, where it operates in isolated villages of tribal peoples in the 
Amazon and Andes. In such places and their equivalents throughout the 
world, peoples who had first contact with the West only a generation or 
two ago, find themselves dealing with international oil conglomerates like 
Shell and Chevron.
The analytic power of the concept of hegemony grows out of its utility 
in providing a theory of class struggle. Class struggle entails a relational 
concept of class. Classes define each other. “There can be no slaveholders 
without slaves, no lords without serfs, no capitalists without workers.” 
Moreover, the means of production mediate these class relationships. 
The question is always who owns the means of production and who 
has to work for the owners. (Parenti 2007:251). At the same time, the 
phenomenology of class relationships depends on perceptions of a dif-
ferent moment in the productive process—commodities. Classes, actually 
people in class relations, perceive each other and themselves through the 
spectacle of commodities (Debord 1967). At least since the 1920s, people 
get their identities from their lifestyles, from the commodities they con-
sume (Marchand 1985). Many of those defining commodities come from 
the culture industries (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944). Gramsci tied both 
the structural analytic of hegemony and its phenomenological counterpart 
to the state arguing that 
not only the philosophy of praxis does not exclude ethical-political his-
tory but that on the contrary its most recent phase of development consists 
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precisely in the vindication of the moment of hegemony as essential to its 
conception of the State and in the “exploitation” of the cultural factor, of 
cultural activity, of a cultural front which is as necessary as the merely eco-
nomic and political ones. 
(Sassoon 1987:111 [her emphasis] citing Gramsci 1975:1224)
Gramsci argues that the state is central in class hegemony. Not only does 
the state monopolize violence and administer forceful coercion, but it is at 
the center of managing the ideological apparatus (Althusser and Balibar 
1968) and culture industries. As an obvious example of the latter, con-
sider the central role of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in managing the broadcast media. Unlike Michel Foucault’s (1978) 
vague and decentered governmentality where controlling powers diffuse 
throughout society in a capillary structure, Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1997) 
analyzed the molding of mass obedience primarily through state agencies. 
The agencies are not the repressive apparatuses of police power, but more 
like Gramsci’s extended state. Primary schools, for instance, instill an 
automatic inclination to form lines to wait in turn. Whether of a liberal or 
authoritarian cast, these examples embodied forms of obedience in pres-
ent regimes—a template for organizing compliance. Embodied obedience 
lies beyond conscious deliberation or analysis.
Hegemony relies as much or more on shaping consciousness, desires, 
and values as it does on threats, force, and physical coercion. Nonetheless, 
these latter coercive strategies always remain ready when cultural appara-
tuses go awry. State forms of control under liberal bourgeois regimes dif-
fer from authoritarian regimes in the relative emphasis each puts on the 
cultural centers and on the manner of their management. Liberal regimes 
manipulate laws and regulations to favor one message over another—for 
example, the FCC changes regulations so that an owner could own 
more than one broadcast outlet in a market. An inevitable result was 
the semimonopoly of Clear Channel in radio across the United States. 
Authoritarian regimes rely more on force such as outright censorship and 
state monopolization of the airwaves. Liberal hegemonies marginalize dis-
sent; authoritarian ones suppress it, often with force and violent coercion.
Authoritarian Control
After the First World War, authoritarian regimes took power in all devel-
oped countries except those of the North Atlantic rim. They emerged 
neither accidentally nor incidentally. Authoritarian states signal a solution 
to the crisis of production of the 1920s. Several historical currents set the 
stage. The war had wrenched the last grip of the old feudal aristocracy 
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from the tiller of the state, most notably in Germany and Russia. Without 
state support, the class of large rentiers could not sustain economic viabil-
ity. The frenzy of industrial destruction during the war, the exhaustion 
of neocolonialism to support profits, and the failure to provide sufficient 
markets led to the financial collapse at the end of the decade. These his-
torically specific forces expressed the long-term crisis of the falling rate of 
profit, the engine of capital. Capital reorganization offered a solution.
What Gramsci called Fordism, alternatively termed Americanism, 
introduced mass production and mass consumption (1971:279–318). 
Mobilization of the masses had been a crucial part of the War with its 
enormous armies. Such statist techniques applied to industry after the 
war ended. Concurrent with the social reorganization of production 
came technological changes. Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915) brought 
the two together by applying machine-oriented discipline to labor 
(Maier 1970:30). Taylorism formed the technological core of Fordism. 
Innovations in machinery, transport, and chemistry contributed to the 
modernization of the world economy. Factories turned to electrifica-
tion with the turbine taking over from the steam engine. Mechanization 
also helped increase agricultural output along with the use of synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides. Especially in the western settlement countries—
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United States, and Uruguay—efficient 
agricultural production overshadowed the local agriculture in Europe 
(Federico 2005) putting even more pressure on the landed elites and 
impoverishing the rural working class. Militant labor resistance became a 
major political crisis following the First World War. In the United States, 
the Red Scare of 1919 combined with the suppression of the antiwar left 
to crush the most militant labor organizations such as the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW). In Europe, elites turned to other means.
Italian Fascism
At first, movements across the political spectrum in Italy included the 
term “fascist,” a reference to the ancient fasces, which was a symbol of 
power, vitality, and unity dating back to Etruscan times. In 1919, Mussolini 
founded the Fasci di Combattimento, a movement that combined militant 
nationalism with vociferous demands for political and social renewal. Its 
strident antisocialist actions included Black Shirt(camicie nere, CCNN, or 
squadristi) attacks on socialist and labor demonstrations. In the elections 
of April 1921, the Fascist political party (Parito Nazionale Fascista, PNF) 
gained 35 out of 535 parliamentary seats, relying mainly on member-
ship from unemployed veterans of the war with its political base in the 
urban, industrialized north. Its antisocialism and anti-Bolshevism drew 
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support from industrialists made uneasy by massive strike waves. Large 
estate owners soon joined in after rural strikes in 1919 and 1920. Although 
originally conceived as a military assault, the March on Rome in October 
1922 drew support from financiers, industrialists, landowners, and impor-
tant elements of the aristocracy and royal family, not least King Vittorio 
Emmanuele III himself, who appointed Mussolini prime minister on 
October 30. Benito Mussolini presided over a coalition government domi-
nated by non-Fascists. A combination of government acts such as dismiss-
ing striking railway workers and Blackshirt local violence fomented fear of 
revolution or civil war. Under anxieties of civil dissolution, the parliament 
voted to change the election laws on July 15, 1923, giving the Fascists a 
majority. Mussolini’s fascist political party (PNF) and its allies won the 
elections of 1924 with a two-thirds majority. Fascist assassins murdered 
Giacomo Matteotti, a socialist member of parliament on June 11, 1924, 
soon after his anti-Fascist speech in parliament. The king continued his 
support of Mussolini who used it to establish a totalitarian, Fascist state, in 
which power was concentrated in his hands, and where the Fascist move-
ment came to dominate virtually all aspects of Italian life. Trade unions 
were banned, and the judiciary came under Fascist control (Bosworth 
2006; Gallo 1964).
The speech of Benedetto Croce in the Italian Senate demonstrates 
liberal bourgeois capitulation to Fascism during a time of social cri-
ses, fears of mass uprisings, and leftist political movements. Although 
later a staunch critic of Fascism, when he could have said something to 
stem Fascism’s advance, Croce helped persuade the senators to support 
Mussolini after the murder of Matteotti. He concluded his address to the 
Senate saying, “We must allow time for Fascism to complete its process of 
change; our vote will be prudent and patriotic.” Subsequently the Senate 
voted 225 to 21 with 6 abstentions to support Mussolini’s government 
(Gallo 1964:188). 
It is frequently forgotten that the word “totalitarian” originated in Italy. 
First applied to Mussolini’s rule in May 1923 by critics, the title totalitarian 
was taken up by the regime after 1925 and applied to itself. On 28 October 
that year, for the third anniversary of the March on Rome, Mussolini 
coined the formula that Fascism meant a system in which “all is for the 
state, nothing is outside the state, nothing and no one are against the state” 
(Bosworth 2006:215).
German Nazism
The First World War ended with a revolution. Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated 
November 9, 1918, and a parliamentary government under Friedrich Ebert 
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of the Socialist Party (SPD) took control of the state, agreeing that an armi-
stice would commence on November 11. The interim government eventu-
ally led to the establishment of the Weimar Republic. By December 31, the 
Spartacist League of revolutionary socialists under the leadership of Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht formed the Communist Party(KPD). 
By January 1919, the KPD led mass uprisings against the government, 
which used the remnants of the army to crush the revolt and assassinate 
Luxemburg and Liebknecht. In Germany, the socialists played the role 
of the left wing of the bourgeoisie, preferring order to equality. Having 
gained control of the government, they used the armed force of the state to 
ensure against revolution. Nonetheless, the socialists failed to win over the 
right wing and reactionary movements, which fashioned their own armed 
forces from disgruntled and unemployed veterans such as the Freikorps 
and Stahlhelm.
From 1920 to 1923, reactionary forces continued fighting against the 
Weimar Republic and left-wing political opponents. In 1920, Wolfgang 
Kapp in the Kapp Putsch briefly overthrew the German government. Mass 
public demonstrations forced the short-lived regime out of power. The 
newly formed National Socialist German Worker’s Party (Nationalsozial-
istische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP)—Nazis—under the leadership 
of Adolf Hitler and with the support of former German army commander 
in chief Erich von Ludendorff, entered into political violence against the 
government and leftist political forces as well. On November 9, 1923, in 
what is now known as the Beer Hall Putsch, the Nazis took control of 
parts of Munich, arresting the President of Bavaria, the chief of police, 
and others and forced them to sign an agreement in which they endorsed 
the Nazi takeover and the Nazi objective to overthrow the German 
government. The putsch came to an end when the German army and police 
were called in to put it down resulting in an armed confrontation where a 
number of Nazis and some police were killed. Tried for treason before 
an openly sympathetic court, Hitler and his coconspirators served only 
months in prison.
The bourgeois socialism of the Weimar Republic appeared to offer a 
solution similar to that of liberal bourgeois regimes in the United States 
and Britain. In fact, it paved the way for the Nazi seizure of power in 
1933 and the establishment of the Third Reich. Once the Nazis seized the 
 government, they passed a series of laws giving them control of the state 
and centralizing state power: the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, gave law-
making power to the Nazi government while two Gleichschaltung laws of 
March 31 and April 7, 1933, centralized state power in Berlin and diluted 
the authority of the federated German states. Also, a series of decrees 
and organizational laws forbid competing political parties established a 
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unified state labor council, subordinated churches to a Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, and generally took command of all organizations and 
cultural apparatuses. As in the case of Mussolini and his fascists, Hitler and 
the Nazis quickly gained hegemony.
Stalinist USSR
Though it may seem strange to argue that Stalinist authoritarianism 
responded to the falling rate of profit in the world capitalist system, it is 
not inapropos. After the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917, Russia 
plunged into civil war until 1923, with the heaviest fighting ending by 
1921. Among other consequences, it devastated the economy. Partly as a 
measure to repair the economy and partly because the Soviet leadership 
lacked enough technical expertise, the Bolshevik government promulgated 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) March 21, 1921, lasting until Stalin con-
solidated power and instituted the first five-year plan and collectivization 
of agriculture in 1928. Under the NEP, the USSR was a mixed capitalist 
economy with some socialist elements. Therefore, Stalin’s accession came 
out of a period when long-term forces affecting world capitalism still buf-
feted the country. Moreover, the world stood on the brink of the great col-
lapse triggered by the U.S. stock market crash of October 24–29, 1929.
Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, however, Stalin did not climb to rule 
through parliamentary politics, but via bureaucratic maneuvering within 
the party and state apparatuses. Beginning in 1928, the country underwent 
a second revolution, or rather its real revolution began after a mere seizure 
of state power in 1917. The five-year plans for industrialization and the 
collectivization of agriculture constituted violent class warfare. “Molotov, 
who became premier in 1930, encouraged the ‘unleashing of the revolu-
tionary forces of the working class and poor and middle peasants’” (Overy 
2004:43). In 1934, the same year that Hitler eliminated the possibility of 
intraparty challenges by his purge of Ernest Röhm and the disbanding 
of the Sturmabteilung, the Brown shirts, Stalin used the murder of Kirov 
(Sergei Kostrikov) to put himself beyond challenge and beyond law. A new 
law allowed the secret police, the OGPU, to arrest terrorist suspects, try 
them secretly and in absentia, and execute them at once (53). From then 
on, under Stalin, the USSR became an authoritarian regime controlling 
every aspect of society. 
The Role of Terror in Authoritarian Control
Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin were certainly dictators, but they were popu-
lar dictators. They, and the regimes they headed, had the kind of support 
58  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
that elected heads of government could only envy. Continual polling and 
market research to which most people have become accustomed was in 
its infancy when these authoritarian regimes took control, but from all 
historical accounts the people of Italy, Germany, and the USSR did not just 
comply with their leaders, they adored them. That is because authoritarian-
ism is an expression of populism. The fulcrum of that populism is terror.
There is a cartoon in which two white-coated, professorial types are 
speaking over a Skinner box, and one is telling the other that placing a 
cat in the box greatly improves the speed of the rats running the maze. 
Nothing motivates like fear, and gratitude is accorded to those who promise 
protection. Authoritarian regimes rely on this simple psychology. Author-
itarian regimes do not terrorize their nations. They point to enemies who 
would terrorize without the state’s protection. Those propaganda films 
showing happy workers and the like spun out by the state in Germany and 
the USSR put an especially glossy façade on the picture, but it was not much 
of a distortion. Most Germans, Italians, and Russians found the 1930s a 
better time than the preceding years. A sense of security suffused the new 
political and economic conditions in contrast to those of the First World 
War and its aftermath. At the same time, they knew that enemies lurked. 
There were foreign, external, and internal enemies—terrorists, wreckers, 
saboteurs, and traitors. A firm hand was needed to ensure the people’s 
safety.
Stalin’s whole political outlook was shaped by a central dualism between 
virtuous Bolshevik revolutionary and counter-revolutionary opponent 
[sic]. “We have internal enemies. We have external enemies,” announced 
Stalin in 1928 during the Shakhaty show trial: “This comrades must not be 
forgotten for a single moment.” . . . Enemies  were always defined as part 
of a network of terror. 
(Overy 2004:177)
. . . Hitler’s attitude to the enemy shared the inflammatory language and 
alien characterization of the Soviet model. In a speech in 1934 he told the 
audience that his movement had saved the German people “from Red ter-
ror.” . . . The enemy was sustained, in Hitler’s view, by alien forces, predomi-
nantly by Jews and Bolsheviks (178–179). 
The Führerprinzip, or in the case of Stalin, the cult of personality 
(Khrushchev 1956), did not eliminate complaints, grumblings, or even 
straightforward political dissent in the three-model authoritarian  societies. 
For the USSR, Sarah Davies (1997); for Germany, Detelev Peukert (1987); 
and for Italy, Luisa Passerini (1986) have shown with varying degrees of 
documentation that the respective publics did not swallow the regimes’ 
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propaganda whole. Nonetheless, the great majority did not just comply 
upon threat of punishment; they actively supported their governments 
even while criticizing particular policies (Gellately 2001; Geyer and 
Fitzpatrick 2009; Bosworth 2006). Even in authoritarian polities, regimes 
do not control the masses and their opinions; they shape and manage 
them mainly through instruments of the state.
Whether, therefore, the masses of Germany, Italy, and the USSR agreed 
or dissented mattered less than their bio-emotional inclination to comply. 
The state remains instrumental in providing the foundation for a willing 
population. Fear builds on that foundation fueled by propaganda but also 
by real threats, even if those threats come from the state itself.
The very real social, economic, and political dislocations of the First 
World War, its immediate aftermath, and the global economic crisis begin-
ning in the late 1920s proved real enough threats and risks. Nonetheless, 
everyday life does not comport well with global and abstract analyses. 
The co-worker who beats a person out of a promotion, a shopkeeper 
who cheats a purchaser, the landlord who evicts, and similar figures play 
the role of concrete dangers. On top of such quotidian insults, there were 
breakdowns in providing essential goods and services, strikes, the hyper-
inflation in Germany, civil war in Russia, and other severe interruptions of 
predictable social relations. In the Soviet Union, famine presented existen-
tial threats. Some of the threats under the authoritarian regimes were of 
their own making. For example, the collectivization of agriculture initiated 
by Stalin in 1928 at least exacerbated, if not caused, famine. The social 
chaos of the 1920s and early 1930s lent itself to authoritarian regimes 
identifying particular enemies of the people who played concrete roles that 
inspired fear and terror—that is, scapegoats.
In Germany, the chaos followed on modernization, democratization, 
and economic collapse. Society had fundamentally changed as a result of 
the disintegration of class boundaries and mass impoverishment; social 
stability had simply collapsed. The question of one’s place in society and 
the meaning of one’s own existence presented itself anew with unexpected 
sharpness. Accordingly, a cultural orientation with changed perceptions of 
reality emerged in the postwar years. Tradition and cultural legacy no lon-
ger constituted the defining categories of this orientation; rather it formed 
around the desire for a new order with long term stability. “Space” (Raum) 
with “people” (Volk) could be understood as eternal concepts, as could 
“soil,” “race,” and “art” (Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel 2009:187).
Similarly in Russia, disruptions of the defeat in the First World War, the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 civil war, and the contradictions of the New 
Economic Policy combined with state-engineered modernization begun 
under the Czarist regime. Ambiguity edging into social chaos had been a 
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reality in the USSR for almost two decades by the time Stalin asserted his 
suzerainty. Not entirely unfounded paranoia found purchase in the USSR of 
the 1930s: the Nazis in Germany and fascist regimes in southern and east-
ern Europe, spy mania, fear of foreigners, and xenophobia combined with 
the capitalist powers invasions during the civil war and their support for 
 subversives (210). These factors provided the background of fear. The terror 
and police state repression secured the fear in the authoritarian regimes.
Terrorizing the Masses
The Czarist regime doubtless deserved its reputation as the most repres-
sive in Europe well before the Bolshevik Revolution. Nonetheless, the 
Bolsheviks did not do away with police state tactics once they seized 
control of the state. Soon after the October 1917 revolution, Lenin estab-
lished the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating 
Counter-Revolution and Sabotage) as a secret police organization. It was 
succeeded by the OGPU, NKVD, KGB, and FSB (currently under the 
new Russia). Despite name changes, their main functions have remained 
remarkably similar.
 “In the 1930s the Stalinists never felt they controlled the country. 
Transportation and communication were poor, and the regime’s repre-
sentatives were few in number, especially outside the cities” (Getty and 
Naumov 1999:15). The Stalinist terror began in the highest levels of the 
ruling party. The expulsion of Trotsky and his followers was followed 
by a purge of the so-called rightists—Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky. 
Nonetheless, police state tactics were already operating in the countryside 
against peasants resisting collectivization and more generally against ban-
dits who roamed relatively freely in a nation not yet recovered from war 
and economic disruption. While Stalin consolidated his power 1928–1932, 
“the Bolsheviks believed that they were involved in a life-or-death ‘class 
war’ against ‘capitalist elements in society. . . . Party discipline took on 
an even more military character than before” (43). The party and its 
police apparatus enforced the Bolshevik revolution violently resulting 
in untold deaths, possibly in the millions. Most such deaths came from 
famine and other generalized conditions and not from deliberate execu-
tions (Thurston 1996). The focused terror began in 1937 when the NKVD 
killed about three quarters of a million, some of whom were party leaders 
but most were ordinary citizens and foreigners (Baberowski and Doering-
Manteuffel 2009; Getty and Naumov 1999). This latter was the Great 
Terror of 1937–1938.
The Nazi terror was far less deadly until the Second World War 
began. Part of the reason resides in the greater degree of development 
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in Germany. Living conditions were less perilous. The Gestapo and 
SS (Sicherheitdienst, SD) arrested tens of thousands. They executed some 
leading Communists and union leaders, but most went to concentration 
camps. Many were tortured, but not interred. Of those sent to the camps, 
most were mistreated, and then released. About 80,000 spent some time 
in the camps prior to Kristallnacht, November 9–10, 1938 (Gellately 
2007:302–303). “Coercion and violence were limited and predictable and 
thus different from the arbitrary and sweeping terror of the Soviet Union” 
(303). Popular media informed the Germans that these measures coun-
teracted Communism. Consequently, public opinion generally supported 
it, and even applauded it. “The Nazis had grown so confident about their 
support from the population by the end of 1933 that they seriously con-
sidered getting rid of both the Gestapo and the camps” (303). Gradually, 
the same tactics applied to outcast ethnic groups, most notably Jews and 
other so-called asocials such as homosexuals. The mass pogrom marked by 
Kristallnacht began a new and different kind of terror eventuating in the 
Final Solution. Nonetheless, most Germans supported this focused kind 
of terror (Burleigh 2001; Burleigh and Wippermann 1991; Fritzsche 1990, 
1998; Gellately 1990; Johnson 1999).
The years 1933–1934 marked social upheaval and economic depriva-
tion throughout the world. In the United States, Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal constituted the remedy. It followed and promoted the liberal welfare-
state solution. It also put the state into the daily lives of most Americans 
to a degree unimaginable just decades before. Moreover, FDR carried out 
many New Deal policies and practices as if acting with plenary powers 
under a state of emergency. Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin faced similar 
disruptive social conditions, albeit with great variation among those 
countries. Their anodyne followed the authoritarian strategy. At some 
point, certainly by September 2001, many of the authoritarian strategies 
displayed by the authoritarian triumvirate came to the United States. 
